The Indian Air Force doesn't have a "sclerosis" problem; it has a reality problem that analysts are too polite to mention. For decades, the armchair generals and think-tank circuit have bemoaned the "dwindling squadron strength" as if it were a simple math equation. They point at the magic number—42 squadrons—and scream about the sky falling because we are hovering in the low 30s. This is a failure of imagination.
The obsession with "procurement delays" as the root of all evil is a convenient fiction. It allows the bureaucracy to blame the process, the politicians to blame the vendors, and the military to blame the budget. In reality, the IAF is currently trapped between the ghost of Soviet-era doctrine and the hollow promise of total self-reliance. If you want to find the true culprit behind the "crisis," look at the fetishization of the Tejas program and the refusal to acknowledge that a smaller, high-tech fleet beats a bloated, mediocre one every single time. Meanwhile, you can explore similar stories here: Japan Is Building Expensive Toys Not Logistics Solutions.
The 42 Squadron Fallacy
The most repeated lie in Indian defense circles is that the IAF needs 42 squadrons to fight a two-front war. This number was cooked up in a different era of warfare, when "persistence" meant throwing waves of low-tech metal at a target until something stuck.
Modern air power isn't about counting tails on a tarmac. It is about sensor fusion, electronic warfare suites, and stand-off range. One Rafale doesn't replace one MiG-21; it replaces an entire flight of them. When you factor in the massive leap in "swing-role" capabilities—the ability of a single airframe to switch from air-to-air to precision strike in a single sortie—the 42-squadron requirement looks less like a strategic necessity and more like a budgetary security blanket. To explore the bigger picture, check out the excellent article by TechCrunch.
I have spent years watching planners agonize over these numbers while ignoring the "availability ratio." What good is a 42-squadron force if 40% of the fleet is grounded awaiting spares from a Russian supply chain that is currently being pulverized in Ukraine? We aren't suffering from a lack of planes; we are suffering from a lack of functional planes. The obsession with buying new toys has completely cannibalized the budget for keeping the current ones in the air.
The Indigenization Trap
We need to talk about the "Make in India" elephant in the room. The push for Atmanirbharta (self-reliance) is a noble political sentiment, but as a defense strategy, it is currently a suicide pact.
The LCA Tejas project is the perfect example of sunk-cost fallacy. It took thirty years to deliver a platform that was already trailing behind global standards by the time it hit Final Operational Clearance. We are now doubling down on the Tejas Mk1A and the Mk2, hoping that sheer willpower will bridge the technology gap. It won't.
When we force the IAF to buy domestic platforms that aren't ready for prime time, we aren't "building a defense industrial base." We are using the front-line pilots as test pilots for a state-owned enterprise (HAL) that has zero accountability. If a private corporation failed to deliver on these timelines, they would be bankrupt. In India, we give them more contracts.
The contrarian truth? If the IAF wants to be a world-class force by 2030, it needs to stop being a laboratory for domestic experiments. It needs to buy off-the-shelf, proven platforms—in bulk—and stop "Indianizing" every single bolt and screw. Customization is the death of speed. Every time the IAF asks for "India-specific enhancements," they add five years to the delivery timeline and $50 million to the unit price.
The Multi-Role Fighter (MRFA) Ghost
The 114 Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) tender is a zombie project. It’s been "just around the corner" for a decade. The reason it hasn't moved isn't just bureaucracy; it's because the government knows that as soon as they pick a winner, they have to admit the domestic program can't handle the load.
The MRFA is the right move for the wrong reasons. We don't need 114 more planes to reach a magic number. We need them to replace the Su-30MKI, which is rapidly becoming a maintenance nightmare. The Sukhoi is the backbone of the fleet, but it has the RCS (Radar Cross Section) of a flying barn and an engine lifespan that makes Western engineers laugh.
Instead of another decade of "evaluation trials," the Ministry of Defence should pick a platform—the Rafale, the F-15EX, whatever—and sign the check tomorrow. The "process" is a shield for people who are afraid to make a decision. In defense procurement, a "good" plane today is worth ten "perfect" planes in 2040.
Stop Fixing the Process, Burn It
Every "reform" committee suggests the same thing: streamline the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP). They want more transparency, more layers of oversight, and more "integrity pacts."
This is exactly backward.
The DAP is already so "transparent" and "accountable" that nobody is willing to sign off on a deal for fear of a CBI investigation ten years down the line. We have created a system where the safest career move for a bureaucrat is to do nothing.
To fix procurement, you don't add more rules; you delete them.
- Kill the L1 (Lowest Bidder) Requirement: In what world do you want the cheapest possible fighter jet? Defense isn't a government tender for office stationery. We should be buying based on "Life Cycle Cost" and mission success rates, not the sticker price.
- Accountability for HAL: If the state-owned manufacturers miss a deadline, the funding should automatically pivot to an international tender. Competition is the only thing that will fix the rot in our domestic production lines.
- The Private Sector Bypass: Stop treating private Indian defense firms like subcontractors to HAL. Let them lead. Let them partner directly with Lockheed, Boeing, or Dassault without the government-owned middleman skimming the profits and slowing the tech transfer.
The Digital Battlefield Myth
We are pouring billions into airframes while our data links and battle management systems are a patchwork of incompatible technologies.
The real crisis in the IAF isn't that we don't have enough wings; it's that those wings can't talk to each other. A MiG-29UPG, a Mirage 2000, and a Rafale should be a seamless sensor net. Instead, they are often operating as "islands of excellence." We are buying Ferraris and driving them on dirt roads.
If we spent half the energy we use on "procuring" planes on "integrating" them, the 31 squadrons we have would be twice as effective. But "software integration" doesn't look as good in a Republic Day parade as a new squadron of jets, so it gets ignored.
The Cost of the "Middle Way"
India's "strategic autonomy" is often just a fancy term for "buying a little bit of everything from everyone." We have French jets, Russian jets, British trainers, American transporters, and Israeli drones.
This is a logistical catastrophe.
The "sclerosis" people talk about is actually the weight of maintaining five different supply chains, five different sets of specialized tools, and five different training programs. This isn't "diversity"; it's a lack of discipline. A contrarian approach would be to pick a primary technology partner and stick with them for 80% of the fleet. The savings in training and maintenance alone would fund three extra squadrons.
But we won't do that. We will keep trying to please every geopolitical partner by buying a dozen of this and twenty of that, then wondering why the "procurement process" is so slow.
The Brutal Reality of 2026
The IAF is currently a museum of 20th-century aviation trying to fight a 21st-century war. The "crisis" isn't coming; it's been here for years. It’s just been masked by the bravery of pilots who are asked to fly "flying coffins" because the bureaucracy is too obsessed with "indigenous percentages" to buy them modern survival gear.
The solution isn't "more squadrons." It's fewer, better, and more integrated platforms. It’s admitting that the Tejas is a light combat aircraft, not a replacement for a heavy multi-role fighter. It’s realizing that "Make in India" only works if the "Make" part actually happens before the technology becomes obsolete.
Stop asking how many squadrons we have. Start asking how many of them can survive a modern BVR (Beyond Visual Range) engagement against a peer competitor. The answer is much lower than 31, and no amount of "process streamlining" will change that until we stop lying to ourselves about what air power actually looks like in the age of AI and electronic dominance.
The IAF doesn't need a procurement fix. It needs a total doctrinal lobotomy. If we keep following the "lazy consensus" of the last twenty years, we won't just have a "sclerosis" in procurement—we'll have a graveyard of good intentions.
Buy the planes. Ignore the "L1" price tag. Force the domestic industry to compete or die. Anything else is just rearranging deck chairs on a sinking Su-30.
